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International Wheat Price Transmission and CAP Reform
Introduction
The linkage between domestic and international markets can be described by the
elasticity of price transmisson. The price transmission elasticity is a measure of the
comovement of prices and shows the extent to which changes in world prices are transmitted
back to within-country prices. It is a measure of economic market integration. Perfect price
transparency will be observed among markets that are fully integrated and well functioning.
Government interventions that affect imports and exports, however, will exert a downward
pressure on the transmission of world prices to domestic markets.
1 On the other hand, trade
liberalization will contribute to greater price transmission elasticities as domestic markets
become better integrated into the world economy. As a result, price instability in world
markets will be lessened as world supply and demand functions become more elastic (Bale
and Lutz, 1979; Johnson, 1998). Although the commodity trade literature emphasizes the
importance and usefulness of these elasticity estimates, little attention has been directed
toward their estimation (Bredahl et al., 1998; Zwart and Meilke, 1979; Tyers and Anderson,
1992; Mundlak and Larson, 1992). Even less attention has been given to how elasticities
change as policy reforms are implemented.
The purpose of this study is to obtain reliable estimates of the international wheat price
transmission elasticity for Germany. We examine a model of cointegration over a period of
policy regime changes. Specifically, we apply the threshold cointegration model of Enders
and Siklos (1999) which allows us to more accurately discern the existence of a long-run
equilibrium relationship among the stochastic processes as well as test for price asymmetry.3
We focus attention on the estimation of the transmission elasticities and how they are
impacted by policy changes. We illustrate the effects of reforms in the European Union’s
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on producer wheat prices in Germany. Of particular
interest is the impact of the 1992 CAP reform and Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA).
The Analytical Framework
According to the law of one price, at a given point in time, the domestic commodity
price should equal its world price, after adjustments are made for exchange rates, policy
effects, transportation and other transactions costs, and product quality differences (Mundlak
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In an efficient and undistorted market b0 = 0 and b1 = 1.0, where ut represents deviations from
the long-run equilibrium at any period. This condition, b0 = 0 and b1 =1.0, can also describe4
markets that are perfectly integrated (Fackler and Goodwin, 1999). The estimate of b1 is the
price transmission elasticity. It is defined as the percentage change in the domestic price in
response to a one-percent change in the world price. Tyers and Anderson (1992) refer to these
elasticities as “price policy parameters” which measure the degree of market insulation, or the
extent to which border prices are transmitted to the domestic market. Similarly, Duttan and
Grennes (1988) interpret the transmission elasticity as a summary measure of all government
policies that separate foreign and domestic markets; they capture the effect of policy on the
domestic response to external changes. This “policy parameter” can be used to evaluate the
impact of domestic trade distorting policies on world markets. For instance, the elasticity of




Over 22 years of monthly domestic and world (border) price data (1976:6 to 1998:12)
were used to estimate the price transmission elasticities. Domestic producer (selling) prices
(DM) for soft wheat in Germany were obtained from the CRONOS data bank of
EUROSTAT. World prices are for No. 2 dark northern spring wheat, CIF Rotterdam ($US),
were obtained from various US Department of Agriculture publications.
3 Monthly DM/$US
currency exchange rates from the IMF were used to place the world price on a local currency
basis.
4
The nominal domestic and world price series were converted to logarithms and are
shown in Figure 1. The data patterns reflect world supply and demand conditions, transfer and5
other transaction costs and, EU agricultural policy. Abstracting from the transactions cost
issue, the relationship between these two curves is largely policy induced by the CAP. But the
CAP has not remained constant over this period; it has changed considerably. Hence, proper
account must be taken of the policy regime changes to obtain reliable estimates of the
relationship between the two stochastic processes. However, before we discuss our estimation
procedures and results, we review the evolution of CAP policy and identify policy regime
subperiods. The empirical analysis that follows will take explicit account of the impact of
these regime periods on the international transmission of price to German wheat producers.
Figure 1 here
EU Policy Environment
For our sample period, three policy regime periods are identified. Subperiod I covers
the sample from 1976:6 to 1988:6, Subperiod II from 1988:7 to 1993:6 and Subperiod III
from 1993:7 to 1998:12.
Subperiod I. The CAP policy regime during this period can be characterized as the
“old CAP”; a highly managed market system of administratively determined prices and
protectionist policies. Because during the sample period the EU was surplus in wheat,
intervention buying was the key mechanism to support internal prices above world levels.
Specifically, in order to keep internal market prices from falling below the administratively
set intervention price (set well above world price levels), intervention agencies would buy
surpluses at the intervention price, store it and then sell on the world market at a loss or, more
commonly, provide private exporters a subsidy (restitution) equal to the difference between
the intervention price and the world price. The objective was to ensure that EU prices6
remained in excess of, and more stable than world prices. Over time surpluses grew as
farmers responded to the high internal prices, and surplus disposal costs escalated.
Subperiod II. Although public debate to reduce intervention prices intensified toward
the end of 1984 and thereafter, the first major policy reform for cereals did not occur until
1988. The 1988 CAP reforms became effective July 1988. At this time, co-responsibility
levies (deductions from farmers to pay for the cost of surplus production), stabilizers (increase
in co-responsibility and reduction in the intervention price the following year, if production
exceeded a maximum guaranteed quantity) and, voluntary set asides (with direct payments)
applied to cereals. The adoption of this “stabilizer package” was touted as the start of a new
era of CAP reform. Indeed, it was an effort to link price levels to output. However, these
efforts were not designed to open domestic markets to the world, but rather to reduce
budgetary costs via lower support prices and other cost reducing measures. While real support
prices fell, the fundamental nature of the CAP remained.
Subperiod III. The CAP reform of 1992 (MacSharry) has been called the first major
structural adjustment in European agricultural policy. The changes were considered so
significant to warrant the name the “new CAP” (Swinbank, 1997). Although truly significant
changes occurred, they were implemented within the existing CAP structure of variable
levies, export restitutions and the like. This structure continued to isolate European agriculture
from the world economy. Implemented in July 1993, the MacSharry reforms called for
compensatory payments to farmers and a continuing lowering of prices supports to levels
closer to expected world prices. The three major components of this reform were: (1) a
substantial cut in intervention prices (30%), phased in over a three year period, (2)
compensation to farmers for the price cuts through subsidies per hectare (area premiums), and
(3) land “set aside” requirements with financial compensation for compliance; preference was7
given to small farmers who could still receive payments without the set aside requirement.
Even though the compensatory payments were not really decoupled form cropped area, this
was a major step toward a market oriented grain economy. It was a regime change financially
as well; a move from largely consumer financed (through higher prices) to where taxpayers
pay a larger share (compensatory transfers). Notwithstanding the significance of these
changes, the old variable levy and export subsidy structure continued to insulate the EU from
world markets.
Subperiod III also includes the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).
The old system of threshold prices and variable levies was abolished under the process of
tariffication; these and other non-tariff barriers were converted to conventional tariffs and
reduced over time. The first of the tariff cuts took place in July 1995 and the new arrangement
limited the import tax so that the landed price could not exceed 155% of the intervention
price. For wheat, the tariff equivalent was to be reduced 36% over a six year period.
Constraints on the total level of support provided by the CAP were also imposed. It is most
important to note that, unlike variable levies, with fixed import levies the landed price will
rise and fall reflecting movements in the world price. This is indeed structural reform.
However, with the “intervention price plus 55%” rule, a de facto variable levy type system
remains operable at “high” reference (world price at Rotterdam) prices. Only at “low”
reference prices do the fixed tariff equivalent rates apply and yield a landed price that varies
directly with the world price. Continued lowering of the intervention price will result in a
broader range over which domestic prices will reflect world market conditions. Until that
time, however, the degree of international price transmission will remain much lower than
desired i.e., the price transmission elasticity will be considerably less than 1.0. The change to
tariff equivalents and limits on the volume of subsidized exports and the total level of
expenditure on export subsidies became operational on July 1, 1995.8
Measures of Price Variability
Measures of the variability of German and world prices were computed for each
period and shown in Table 1. Over the total sample period, the variability of world prices was
considerably greater than the variability of German domestic prices. This relationship is also
true for each subperiod, where world price variability in subperiods I and II are some three-
fold the domestic price. Even with the CAP reforms of 1992 and the subsequent URAA, the
variability of domestic price in subperiod III remains less than half of that for the world. As
noted above, except at very low world prices, a variable levy system remains under URAA. It
is interesting to note that world prices have become progressively more stable over the three
subperiods. However, the EU reforms of 1992 resulted in a noticeable increase in domestic
price volatility while at the  same time world price volatility lessened. For sure, a contributing
factor to this “inverse relationship” in price volatility has been the worldwide trade
liberalizing efforts over the past decade. For the post-URAA period by itself, the German
price variability measure fell slightly (over subperiod III) while the variability of world price
fell dramatically to just 1.86 percent. Indeed, monthly world wheat prices have become more
stable.
Table 1 here
Integration, Cointegration and Asymmetry Tests
As a first step of the empirical investigation we implement the well-known augmented




- - + D + + + = D
n
i
t i t i t t Y Y t Y
1
1 3 1 0 e g a a a (3)
with and without the linear time trend t. D denotes the difference operator DYt = (1 – B)Yt = Yt   
– Yt-1 and Yt the time series under investigation. The t-statistic  m tˆ  tests the null hypothesis of a
unit root with only a constant term in the alternative hypothesis and the t-statistic  t tˆ  refers to
the test with a constant term and a linear time trend in the alternative hypothesis. The choice
of the lag length n in equation (3) consists of estimating the number of autoregressive terms
according to the largest lag with a statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level (Hall,
1994). The general-to-specific model selection procedure starts with a lag length of 16
months.
The results of the unit root tests are outlined in Table 2. According to the t-statistics  m tˆ
and  t tˆ we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit  root in both time series 
d
t p  and 
w
t p . This
finding is insensitive to the specification of the deterministic component and holds for the
whole sample period 76:6 – 98:12 as well as for subsample periods 76:6 – 88:6, 88:7 – 93:6
and 93:7 – 98:12.
5
Table 2 here
To estimate and test for cointegration we use the technique suggested by Enders and
Siklos (1999) which is an extension of the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure. The first step
of the Engle-Granger procedure consists of estimating the long-run relationship between the
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b1 is the long-run parameter and ut the disturbance term which may be serially correlated. The
second step focuses on the estimate of r in the regression:
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where the residuals from equation (4) are used. The rejection of the null hypothesis of no
cointegration implies that the residuals ut are stationary. Implicit in the Engle-Granger
cointegration approach is the assumption that a tendency to move toward the long-run
equilibrium is present every time period. Yet it is possible that movements toward the long-
run equilibrium relationship need not occur in every period. According to the threshold
cointegration technique proposed by Enders and Siklos the cointegrating relationship can be
locally inactive inside a given range and then become active once the system gets too far from
the equilibrium relationship. While the deviation from the equilibrium relationship ut may
locally have a unit root, globally the time series ut is stationary (Balke and Fomby, 1997).
A formal way to quantify the adjustment process is:
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The Enders-Siklos test approach consists in obtaining a F-statistic for the null
hypothesis H0: r1 = r2 = 0 and the comparison of this sample statistic with the critical value in
Enders and Siklos (1999). With respect to the selection of the lag length n in equation (6) we
again apply Hall’s procedure. The Enders-Siklos procedure allows the modelling of short–run
persistent deviations from the long-run equilibrium and an analysis of asymmetric adjustment.
If we can reject the null hypothesis H0: r1 = r2 = 0, it is possible to test for symmetric versus
asymmetric adjustment to the long-run equilibrium using the usual F-statistic with the
conventional  F-distribution. The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment
H0: r1 = r2 versus the alternative hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment.
Table 3 contains the results of the cointegration analysis. We wished to test for
difference between the MacShary and URAA regimes but we only had 24 observations in the
former period; not sufficient to warrant a separate regression. Thus, the regression for the
subsample period 93:7 – 98:12 contains a dummy variable for the 93:7 – 95:6 period. The
estimated parameter was positive. The second column of Table 3 reports the estimated long-
run price transmission elasticity  1 ˆ b . As shown in Stock (1987), these estimates are
superconsistent in case of cointegration. Unfortunately, we cannot present t-statistics because
the corresponding standard errors are biased. As can be seen the estimated price transmission
elasticity differs remarkably depending on the length of the sample period. Our results show
significant increases in the transmission elasticities as increasingly liberalized policy reforms
have been implemented. With respect to the results of the cointegration analysis the
adjustment coefficients  2 1 ˆ   and   ˆ r r  have the correct negative sign suggesting convergence.12
While we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the whole sample period,
the F-statistics  COIN F ˆ  for the subsample periods reject the null hypothesis indicating the
existence of stable long-run relationship between both time series. Furthermore, we cannot




Reliable estimates of the international price transmission elasticities are important in
order to accurately assess the impact of a policy regime change. In this paper, monthly data
from 1976 to 1998 were used to examine the relationship between world and domestic wheat
prices in the European Union. We identify key points of CAP reform and use this knowledge
of structural change in our empirical estimation. Three policy regime periods are identified.
Cointegration analysis is used to demonstrate the policy reform on the transmission of world
market signals to German wheat producers. Further, computed measures of price variability
show increased domestic price volatility and decreased world volatility in world prices as
reforms are made to the CAP.
The long-run equilibrium transmission elasticities ranged from 0.18 during the highly
administered period of the 70s and 80s to 0.30 during the post-URAA period. Our estimates
are substantially lower than other estimates for the EU. For example, the elasticity estimate of
Mundlak and Larson (1992) was 0.72 during the highly administered period of 1960–85.13
While the EU is a long way from maintaining open agricultural markets, our results support
the hypothesis that market liberalizing policies indeed increase price transparency.14
                                               
1 However, imposition of an ad valorem tariff can increase the price instability of the
importing country which imposes the tariff (Bale and Lutz, 1979).
2 In equation (1) we have adjusted only for exchange rates, not transportation or other
transactions costs. Because of the close geographical proximity of the two price series, the
omission of these costs will likely have little impact on the empirical results.
3 The CIF Rotterdam prices do not include variable import levies of tariffs.
4 The nominal price series were deflated by the monthly consumer prices indices for Germany
and the US. Statistical tests showed no discernible difference between the deflated and
undeflated series; hence, nominal prices were selected for analysis.
5 In addition to the results contained in Table 2 we have performed augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests including seasonal dummies in the regression equation (3) to take account of
deterministic seasonality in both time series. As a result the findings are qualitatively the
same.
6 The Enders-Siklos procedure does not allow the investigation of structural breaks using, for
example, Chow tests because the estimated standard errors are unreliable.15
                                                                                                                                                  
Table 1: Variability of German and World Monthly Wheat Prices (%)
Sample Period German Prices World Prices
Total: 76:6 – 98:12 1.76 3.90
Subperiod I: 76:6 – 88:6 1.20 4.30
Subperiod II: 88:7 – 93:6 0.92 2.62
Subperiod III: 93:7 – 98:12 1.16 2.49
URAA: 95:7 – 98:12 1.11 1.86
Note: The nominal monthly prices are in logarithms and the CIF Rotterdam prices are
converted to German Marks (DM). The price variability is measured as trend-corrected
coefficient of variation following the approach of Cuddy and Della Valle (1978).16
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- 1.38 1 - 2.56 1
Note:  m tˆ and  t tˆ  are t-statistics of the Dickey-Fuller tests corresponding to a regression with a
constant term and, a constant term as well as a linear time trend, respectively. n denotes the
lag length which is chosen according to the largest lag with a statistically significant
coefficient at the 5% level (Hall, 1994). Critical values can be found in MacKinnon (1991).17
                                                                                                                                                  
Table 3: Results of the Cointegration Analysis
Sample Period 1 ˆ b 1 ˆ r 2 ˆ r COIN F ˆ
ASY F ˆ n
76:6 – 98:12 0.54 – 0.03  – 0.01 1.61 0.26 5
76:6 – 88:6 0.18 – 0.16  – 0.08 5.44* 0.64 1
88:7 – 93:6 0.18  – 0.37  – 0.26 6.94* 0.19 1
93:7 – 98:12 0.25  – 0.48  – 0.26 10.14* 0.93 1
95:7 – 98:12 0.30  – 0.39  – 0.36 7.03* 0.02 1
Note:  1 ˆ b  is the estimated long-run elasticity from the regression  t
d u Pw P + + = 1 0 b b ,
2 1 ˆ   and   ˆ r r  the estimated adjustment coefficients,  COIN F ˆ  the F-statistic to test the null
hypothesis of no cointegration and  ASY F ˆ  the F-statistic to test symmetric adjustment. *
denotes significant test statistic at a 5% level. Critical values can be found in Enders and
Siklos (1999).18
                                                                                                                                                  
References
Bale, M.D. and Lutz, E. “The Effects of Trade Intervention on International Price Instability”.
Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 61 (August, 1979): 512 – 16.
Balke, N.S. and Fomby, T. “Threshold Cointegration”. Intern. Econ. Rev. 38, (August, 1997):
627 – 45.
Bredahl, M.E., Meyers, W.H and Collins, K.J. “The Elasticity of Foreign Demand for U.S.
Agricultural Products: The Importance of the Price Transmission Elasticity”. Amer. J.
Agr. Econ. 61 (February, 1979): 58 – 63.
Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W.A. “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series
with a Unit Root”. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 74 (June, 1979): 427 – 31.
Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W.A. “The Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time
Series with Unit Roots”. Econometrica. 49 (July, 1981): 1057 – 72.19
                                                                                                                                                  
Dutton, J and Grennes, T. “The Role of Exchange Rates in Trade Models”. Chapter 4 in
Elasticities in International Agricultural Trade, eds., Carter, C.A. and Gardiner, W.H.,
Westview Press 1988.
Enders, W. and Siklos, P.L. “Cointegration and Threshold Adjustment”. Working Paper
Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (1999).
Engle, R.F. and Granger, C.W.J. “Co-Integration and Error Correction Representation,
Estimation and Testing.” Econometrica. 55 (March, 1987): 251 – 76.
Fackler, P.L and Goodwin, B.K. “Spatial Price Analysis”. Handbook of Agricultural
Economics,  Amer. Agr. Econ. Assoc., forthcoming, 1999.
Hall, A. “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series with Pretest Data-Based Model Selection”. J.
Bus. Econ. Stat. 12 (October, 1994): 461 – 70.
Johnson, D.G. “Food Security and World Trade Prospects”. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 80
(December, 1998): 941 – 47.
MacKinnon, J.G. “Critical Values for Cointegration Tests, in Long-Run Economic
Relationships”.  Readings in Cointegration, (Eds) R.F. Engle, and C.W.J. Granger,
Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991): 267 – 76.
Mundlak, Y. and Larson D.F. “On the Transmission of World Agricultural Prices”. World
Bank Econ. Rev. 6 (September, 1992): 399 – 422.20
                                                                                                                                                  
Stock, J. H. “Asymptotic Propertries of Least Squares Estimators of Co-Integrating Vectors”.
Econometrica 55 (September, 1987): 1035 – 1056.
Swinbank, A. “The New CAP” in The Common Agricultural Policy. Eds. Ritson, C. and D.R.
Harvey. (London: CAB International), 1997.
Tyers, R. and Anderson, K. Disarray in World Food Markets: A Quantitative Assessment.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Zwart, A.C. and Meilke, K.D. “The Influence of Domestic Pricing Policies and Buffer Stocks
on Price Stability in the World Wheat Industry”. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 61 (August,
1979): 434 – 44.